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This study investigates the prolonged effects of physiological responses induced by
acute stress on risk-taking in decision-making. Participants were divided into a Stress
group (N = 14) and a Control group (N = 12). The Trier Social Stress Test was
administered as an acute stressor, and reading was administered as a control task;
thereafter, participants performed a decision-making task in which they needed to
choose a sure option or a gamble option in Gain and Loss frame trials 2 h after
(non-) exposure to the stressor. Increased cortisol, adrenaline, heart rate (HR), and
subjective stress levels validated acute stress manipulation. Stressed participants made
fewer risky choices only in the Gain domain, whereas no effect of stress was shown
in the Loss domain. Deceleration of HR reflecting attention was greater for Gains
compared with Losses only in the Stress group. Risk avoidance was determined by
increased levels of cortisol caused by acute stress. These results suggest that processes
regarding glucocorticoid might be involved in the prolonged effects of acute stress on
the evaluation of risks and the monitoring of outcomes in decision-making.
Keywords: acute stress, decision-making, risk, reflection effect, cortisol
INTRODUCTION
Many important decisions, particularly in economics, are made under stress. For example, stock
dealers must make financial decisions under time and psychological pressures while facing
difficulties in the workplace and in interpersonal relationships. Influences of acute stress on
decision-making have been supported by accumulated empirical findings (Starcke and Brand,
2012) and by observations of real financial working conditions, for instance, in stock trading
centers (Coates and Herbert, 2008). However, the investigation of physiological mechanisms
underlying influences of acute stress on decision-making is only in its primary stages.
Previous human psychological studies have generally reported facilitation of risk-taking in
several kinds of decision-making tasks after exposure to acute stress (e.g., Lighthall et al., 2009;
Galvan and McGlennen, 2012; Morgado et al., 2015). However, the findings from previous
studies are complicated and mixed. For example, acute stress facilitated risk avoidance when
decisions involved gains but facilitated risk preference when decisions involved losses, resulting in
a strengthened “reflection effect,” i.e., greater preference for risky options linked with losses rather
than gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Porcelli and Delgado, 2009). However, the opposite
result, that acute stress led to risk avoidance of losses, has also been reported (Clark et al., 2012).
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Furthermore, some studies found null effects of acute stress on
risk-taking in decision-making (Lempert et al., 2012; Gathmann
et al., 2014).
A possible cause of inconsistency of previous findings
is temporal characteristics of stress responses. Immediately
after exposure to acute stress, responses in several biological
systems progress in parallel, for example, the sympatho-
adrenal medullary (SAM) system (Kvetnansky et al., 2009),
the hypothalamus–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) axis (Kudielka and
Kirshbaum, 2004), and inflammation (Dantzer, 2006). Temporal
changes in levels of activity in these systems should inevitably
show complications because such systems are mutually linked
by positive- and negative-feedback pathways (Dantzer, 2006). In
addition, because substances involved in these systems, such as
catecholamine, corticosteroids, and cytokines, have facilitating
and inhibiting influences on the central nervous system related to
cognitive and emotional processes underlying decision-making
(Preston et al., 2007; Wolf, 2009; Starcke and Brand, 2012), the
effects of acute stress on risk-taking should fluctuate and be
unstable in the period immediately after the onset of acute stress.
Indeed, risk avoidance was first observed when the decision-
making task was performed 5 or 18 min after acute stress, but
risk-taking was promoted when a decision-making task was
performed 28 min after stress (Pabst et al., 2013).
Previous literature has shown that, even hours after the
induction of stress, acute stress can robustly affect many facets of
higher-order cognitive functions, including emotional memory
(Diamond et al., 2007), selective attention to emotional stimuli
(Henckens et al., 2012), working memory (Henckens et al., 2011),
and altruistic punishment in an economic game (Vinkers et al.,
2013). These findings led us to infer the possibility of acute stress
also affecting decision-making under risk in longer time ranges.
If this inference is correct, an important question regarding
underlying biological mechanisms is whether the strength of
physiological responses (HPA and SAM responses) (Diamond
et al., 2007) to acute stress at an early stage can determine
the strength of later stress effects on bias toward risk-taking in
decision-making. The present study explored this issue with an
experiment measuring typical physiological indices of stress and
risky choices in a lottery decision-making task performed 2 h
after exposure to acute stress.
Furthermore, we examined two issues of psychological
mechanisms through which acute stress can affect later decision-
making. The first issue is whether effects of acute stress on
risk-taking occur through experiential or descriptive processes
(Buckert et al., 2014). Namely, acute stress might affect
psychological responses to hit-and-miss feedback; therefore,
stress can bias future risk-taking through learning processes (the
experience account). On the other hand, acute stress might affect
evaluations of the magnitude of reward and probability and can
thus bias risk-taking (the description account). To examine this
issue, we tested dependency of risky choice rates on previous
outcomes. If the experiential account is correct, a probability
of a risky choice would increase just after receiving a reward
and decrease just after losing a reward (Win-Stay, Lose-Shift).
If the description account is correct, a probability of a risky
choice would be rather independent of previous outcomes. In
addition, we measured the transient deceleration of heart rate
(HR) as an orienting response, which is a typical physiological
response to feedback signals in decision-making (Bradley, 2009;
Osumi and Ohira, 2009). If the experiential account is correct,
HR deceleration should correlate with risk-taking after exposure
to acute stress. If the description account is correct, acute stress
should independently affect HR deceleration and risk-taking. The
second issue is whether alterations in risk-taking caused by acute
stress are based on habit action or goal-directed action (Schwabe
et al., 2008; Dias-Ferreira et al., 2009). Acute stress can make habit
action more dominant; therefore, individuals might habitually
prefer or avoid risk without deliberating over expected gains or
losses. Contrarily, acute stress can facilitate individuals’ strategic
deliberation in preferring or avoiding risk to satisfy their inner
goals. To examine this issue, we manipulated expected values
(EV) of a safer and a riskier option in each decision-making trial.
In some trials, the riskier option provided higher EV than the
safer option, while in other trials, the EV of the risker option
was lower than that of the safer option, or EVs of both options
were identical. If acute stress makes habit action dominant,
participants should show consistent within-individual tendencies
of risk preference or risk avoidance regardless of differences
of EVs. However, if acute stress facilitates goal-directed action,
participants should become more sensitive to EVs of options, and
they should make risk-taking or risk-avoiding choices depending
on relative comparisons of the EVs of options.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In the present study, 28 Japanese male undergraduates at Nagoya
University participated (age range 18–22 years; mean = 19.92;
SD = 1.20). They were randomly assigned to a Stress group or
a Control group. This sample size was determined according to
a priori analysis of statistical power using G∗power 3, version 3.
1. 9. 2 (Faul et al., 2007). A sample size adequate to detect the
effect size reported by Pabst et al. (2013), indicating significant
effects of acute stress on risky choice, was estimated as N = 24
(alpha error = 0.05; 1-beta error = 0.95). Two participants
in the Stress group were excluded from analysis because of
technical problems in data collection. No participants suffered
from any chronic illnesses, and none took any medications.
Participants were advised not to smoke or drink alcohol on days
they participated in the experiments. The Ethics Committee of
Nagoya University approved the study (No.: 315, date: 25th June,
2012), and its methods were conducted according to approved
guidance for human subjects. All participants signed an informed
consent before participating in the study.
Decision-Making Task
At the beginning of each trial, participants were shown a message
indicating a starting amount of money. They had to choose a sure
or a gamble option for each trial. The sure option meant keeping
the amount of money given at the beginning in Gain frame trials
and losing the amount given at the beginning in Loss frame
trials. The gamble option was shown as a pie chart depicting
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the probability of Hit (red) or Miss (blue) and the amount of
monetary reward or loss (see Figure 1). Options were presented
for 2 s, followed by a response cue to prompt participants to
choose. After the choice, a feedback signal (Keep, Hit, or Miss)
was indicated.
In this task, we manipulated EV to assess decision-makers’
sensitivity and adaptability to contingencies making a choice
advantageous or disadvantageous. For this manipulation, we set
conditions at three different EV levels between gamble and sure
options: a large EV gamble with a larger EV of the gamble
option than of the sure option; a small EV gamble with a
smaller EV of the gamble option than of the sure option; and
an equal EV gamble with the same EV of the gamble option as
of the sure option. Therefore, independent variables in this task
were Domain (Gain or Loss) and EV of gamble option (Large,
Equal, and Small). Additionally, we manipulated the probability
of the hit outcomes when the gamble option was chosen (see
Supplement 1). Gain and Loss trials were presented as separate
blocks, with counterbalanced orders across participants in each
group. Within a block, conditions of the EV gamble option were
presented randomly.
Procedures
Experimental sessions started at either 09:00 a.m. or 12:00 p.m.
and lasted for 4 h. To control effects of diurnal variations in
cortisol secretion, numbers of participants allocated into early
and late experimental sessions were counterbalanced between
Stress and Control groups. Participants were instructed to eat a
light breakfast on the morning of the experiment, but not to drink
caffeinated beverages. Participants suffering from an infectious
illness within 2 weeks of the experiment were rescheduled.
The timeline of the experimental session for both groups
is presented in Figure 2. After participants entered the
experimental chamber, a cannula was inserted into their non-
dominant forearm vein. Next, electrodes for electrocardiographic
measurements were attached to the same arm. After the first
rest period of 10 min, the first blood sample was taken as a
baseline, and participants were asked to rate subjectively their
intensity of stress. Thereafter, instructions for the “Trier Social
Stress Test” (TSST) (Kirschbaum et al., 1993) were provided.
Following this, participants were given 10 min to prepare for their
speech. They were then exposed to a simulated interview (5 min)
in front of a video camera and conducted by two interviewers,
followed by a mental arithmetic task (5 min). Immediately after
the task, a second blood sample was taken, and participants
again subjectively rated their stress. Participants read newspapers
during the 120-min rest period. After each rest period (30, 60,
90, or 120 min after completing the TSST), the third, fourth,
and fifth blood samples were taken; again, participants rated
their stress subjectively. Finally, instructions for the decision-
making task were given, and participants completed the decision-
making task after several practice trials. Cardiodynamic activity
was measured continuously throughout the experimental session.
After the procedure ended, electrodes and the cannula were
FIGURE 1 | Decision-making task.
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental protocol of the present study.
removed, and participants were fully debriefed and thanked. The
experimental session in the Control group was identical to that
in the Stress group, except that participants read newspapers for
20 min instead of focusing on the TSST.
Psychological and Behavioral Measures
Participants were asked to evaluate intensity of their stress on a
visual analog scale (0–100%) after the baseline period, the TSST
task period, each rest period, and the decision-making period.
For a behavioral index of decision-making, we calculated rates
of gamble choices in each condition of the decision-making
task. As a trial-wise behavioral index to evaluate dependency
of risk-taking on a previous outcome, we calculated the rates
of gamble choices after each outcome (e.g., keep, gamble-hit,
and gamble-miss) in each condition. In addition, conditional
entropy was calculated as a global index of dependency of risk-
taking on previous outcomes (Ohira et al., 2013a, 2014). First, we
determined a conditional probability of an action (a) under a state
(S). Here, the action is a choice of gamble or keep. The state is an
outcome (keep, gamble-hit, or gamble-miss) in the previous trial.
Thus, the conditional probability P(a|S) is calculated as follows:
P(a|S) = Num(a|S)+ c∑
k{Num(k|S+ c)}
,
where Num(a|S) is the number of choices of gamble or keep (a)
under a state S, and Num(k|S) is the number of total choices k
under a state S. The constant c was introduced to stabilize the
calculated probability and was fixed to 1 here. Then, entropy H
was estimated as follows:
H = − 1
N
∑
S
∑
a
P(a|S) log2 P(a|S),
where N is a number of states S. The value of entropy H was
standardized from 0 to 1 by dividing by N (here, N = 3).
Conditional entropy calculated by this formula reflects the degree
of deviation from dependence of a choice on the outcome of
the previous trial. For example, if a participant more often
chooses gamble when hit was given in the previous trial and
chooses keep when miss was given in the previous trial (Win-
Stay, Lose-Shift), then H will be smaller (approaching 0). This
pattern of decision-making can be regarded as more dependent
on previous outcomes and thus more experiential. Conversely,
as a participant more often chooses gamble or keep totally
independently from the previous trial’s outcome, then entropy H
will be larger (approaching 1). This pattern of decision-making
is regarded as more independent from previous outcomes and
probably stochastically determined based on an inner standard
and is thus more descriptive.
Cortisol and Adrenaline Measurement
Blood samples were collected in EDTA tubes and centrifuged
at 3,000 rpm for 10 min to measure cortisol levels in plasma.
Plasma was then separated and stored at −80◦C until analysis.
The plasma cortisol concentration was measured using a cortisol
ELISA kit (Oxford Biochemical Research Inc., Oxford, MI, USA).
The intra-assay coefficient of variation was 3.4–3.7%, and the
inter-assay coefficient of variation was 3.8–6.4%. The limit of
detection was 0.3 µg/ml. To determine adrenaline levels, blood
samples were collected in serum separator tubes and centrifuged
for 15 min. Serum was removed and then kept at −80◦C until
analysis. The concentration of adrenaline in serum was measured
using an HPLC-electrochemical detector (ECD) (CoulArray; ESA
Biosciences, Inc.). The inter-assay coefficient of variation was less
than 7.0%. The limit of detection was 0.1 ng/ml.
Cardiac Measure
Cardiodynamic activity was recorded with an electrocardiogram
(ECG) at 500 Hz, using the MP 100 system (Biopac Systems Inc.,
Goleta, CA, USA) and Ag/AgCL electrodes on the extremities.
Analysis of ECG waveforms was performed using AcqKnowledge
software for MP 100 (Biopac System, Santa Barbara, CA, USA).
After rejection of artifacts in ECG waveforms, HR and inter-beat-
interval data were derived during the baseline period (10 min),
the stress tasks period (15–20 min), each rest period (30 min),
and the decision-making period (40–45 min). To analyze cardiac
data in the decision-making task, inter-beat intervals were
obtained from deviations between R-waves and converted into
beats per minute (bpm). HR in bpm was averaged in half-
second intervals and deviated from the 1-s baseline preceding
feedback onset. Initial deceleration was assessed as a minimum
value in 0–3 s of the feedback presentation period in each
trial. As is known, HR deceleration reflects attentional orienting
governed by parasympathetic activity (Bradley, 2009; Osumi
and Ohira, 2009). For this reason, we focused on examining
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outcome-related HR reactivity induced by feedback signals of hit
and miss.
Experimental Design and Statistical
Analyses
To certify that the TSST evoked acute stress responses, data
showing HR, cortisol, adrenaline, and subjective stress levels
during the TSST were analyzed using 2 (Group: Stress vs.
Control) × 7 (Period: Baseline, TSST, Rest30 min, Rest60 min,
Rest90 min, Rest120 min periods, Decision-making task) repeated
measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Group was a between-
participant factor, and Period was a within-participant factor. To
analyze decision-making performance, rates of gamble choice,
and conditional entropy were administrated for a 2 (Group:
Stress vs. Control) × 2 (Domain: Gain vs. Loss) × 3 (EV
level of gamble option: Large, Equal, and Small) repeated
measures ANOVA. Group was a between-participant factor,
and Domain and EV level were within-participant factors.
Furthermore, for rating gamble choice per previous outcome,
a 2 (Group: Stress vs. Control) × 2 (Domain: Gain vs.
Loss) × 3 (EV level of gamble option: Large, Equal, and
Small) × 3 (Previous outcome: Keep, Gamble-hit, Gamble-
miss) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. Previous
outcome was a within-participant factor. Cardiac data for
feedback in the decision-making task were analyzed using a 2
(Group: Stress vs. Control) × 2 (Domain: Gain vs. Loss) × 2
(Outcome: Hit vs. Miss) × 3 (EV level of gamble option:
Large, Equal, and Small) repeated measures ANOVA. Group
was a between-participant factor and Domain, Outcome, and EV
level were within-participant factors. The Greenhouse–Geisser
epsilon correction factor ε (Jennings and Wood, 1976), was used
where appropriate. When significant interactions were found in
ANOVAs, post hoc analyses using Bonferroni tests (p< 0.05) were
conducted to examine which combinations of data points differed
significantly.
To examine the association between physiological acute
stress responses and decision-making, structural equation
modeling (SEM) was conducted using physiological parameters
as predictors for rates of gamble choice in decision-making (for
details, see Results, Association between physiological parameters
and decision-making). Considering the sample size of the present
study, overall model fit was assessed using chi-square/degree of
freedom (df) ratio, goodness-of-fit index (GFI), and root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA). A chi-square/df ratio
≤0.20, a GFI ≥ 0.95, and an RMSEA ≤ 0.05 are considered the
standard of a good fit (West et al., 2012).
RESULTS
Manipulation Check of Acute Stress
Results of psychological data are presented in Table 1. A repeated
measures ANOVA revealed significant interaction between
Group and Period, [F(3.53,84.74) = 7.70, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.25].
Post hoc analyses (p < 0.05) indicated that perception of stress
after the TSST task was higher than that at baseline in the
Stress group. Significant interaction between Group and Period
TABLE 1 | Means (Standard Error of Mean) in the intensity of stress and
results of ANCOVA.
Baseline TSST Rest
30 min
Rest
60 min
Rest
90 min
Rest
120 min
Decision-
making
task
Stress 2.05 5.47∗ 2.24 1.78 2.28 2.37 3.97
(1.95) (2.37) (1.24) (1.29) (1.77) (2.12) (1.41)
Control 1.03 1.19 1.63 1.57 1.36 1.42 3.21
(1.12) (0.92) (0.80) (0.73) (0.67) (0.77) (1.31)
∗Significant differences from baseline value in each group (p < 0.05).
FIGURE 3 | Cortisol concentration in each group. Error bars indicate
standard errors of means.
was observed for cortisol, [F(3.88,93.15) = 4.46, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.16] (Figure 3). The cortisol level significantly increased
after the TSST task compared with the level at baseline or
levels during rest periods in the Stress group, but not in
the Control group (p < 0.05). Significant interaction between
Group and Period for HR was found [F(3.31,79.45) = 12.93,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.35] (Figure 4). Further analyses (p < 0.05)
indicated that HR increase in the Stress group was greater
during speech tasks compared with the Control group. As an
index of activation of the sympathetic nervous system, adrenaline
concentration showed significant interaction between Group and
Period [F(3.83,91.93) = 6.50, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.21] (Figure 5).
Post hoc analyses (p < 0.05) indicated that after the TSST task,
adrenaline level in the Stress group was higher than that of
the Control group, but no difference was observed during rest
periods. All these indices consistently clarified that the stress
task in this study elicited typical, robust psychological and
physiological (SAM and HPA) acute stress responses.
Effects of Stress on Decision-Making
Gamble Choice and Conditional Entropy
Gamble choice rates in experimental conditions are shown in
Figure 6. There was significant interaction between Group,
Domain, and EV level [F(2,48) = 4.66, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.16].
Post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05) revealed that the gamble
choice rate in the Equal EV level for the Gain domain in the
Stress group was smaller than that in the Control group. The
gamble choice rates for each previous outcome are summarized
in Table 2. Naturally, a main effect of EV level was significant
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FIGURE 4 | Heart rate (HR) through experimental sessions in each
group. Error bars indicate standard errors of mean.
[F(1.54,37)= 86.59, p< 0.001, η2p = 0.78], suggesting the gamble
option was chosen more as the EV of the gamble option was
higher than that of the safe option. Also, a main effect of Previous
FIGURE 5 | Adrenaline concentration in each group. Error bars indicate
standard errors of means.
FIGURE 6 | Rates of gamble choice. ∗Significant difference between
groups (p < 0.05).
outcome was significant [F(1.48,35.59) = 20.94, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.47], and post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05) indicated
that the gamble option choice was less after a participant
chose the sure option compared to after he chose the gamble
option. Furthermore, an interaction between Previous outcome
and EV level was significant [F(2.55,61.19) = 2.92, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.11]. Post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05) revealed that
the gamble choice rate after a keep trial was smaller than
that after a hit or a miss trial when the EV of the gamble
choice was smaller than or equal to the sure option. Significant
effects regarding Group (Stress vs. Control) were not observed.
As shown in Table 3, overall, conditional entropy showed
relatively higher values (H > 0.50) in all experimental conditions.
Neither main effects nor interactions indicated significant levels
(F < 1.60); thus, acute stress showed no effect on conditional
entropy.
Cardiac Responses to Gamble Outcomes in
Decision-Making
The means of magnitudes of HR deceleration from baseline
(HR values for 1 s preceeding feedback onset; see Methods,
Cardiac measure) are summarized in Figure 7A. An ANOVA for
magnitudes of HR deceleration revealed a significant interaction
between Group, Domain, and EV [F(7.78,41.42)= 4.13, p< 0.05,
η2p = 0.02]. Post hoc comparisons (p < 0.05) revealed that HR
in the Equal EV level for the Gain domain in the Stress group
decelerated more than that in the Control group. As shown in
Figure 7B, HR time-locked to gamble outcomes in the Equal
EV level showed deceleration that can be interpreted as a typical
orienting response. In contrast to gamble option choice, HR
deceleration to outcome of a sure option was less than that to
outcome of a gamble option (p < 0.01), and no difference was
shown between groups (see Supplement 2).
There was no correlation between gamble choice rate and
HR deceleration during the decision-making period in each
experimental condition (r < −0.33, n.s.). Therefore, HR
deceleration reflecting trial-by-trial attention to decision-making
outcomes did not influence the rate of gamble choice, contrary to
the experiential account. Because this result indicated that gamble
choice and HR deceleration are independent, we conducted
further analyses of these variables separately, as explained in the
following section.
Association between Physiological
Parameters and Decision-Making
Hypothetical Model
To examine the association between physiological responses
caused by acute stress and later decision-making, we conducted
structural equation modeling (SEM). We established the
hypothetical models shown in Figures 8A,B. As described
above, because HR deceleration did not affect rates of gamble
choice, these were treated as different dependent variables and
analyzed separately. In this analysis, we focused on the Equal
EV level condition in the Gain domain, in which significant
effects of acute stress on decision-making were observed.
Magnitudes of HR deceleration to hit and miss outcomes
of gamble choices were averaged for each participant and
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showed relatively higher values (H > 0.50) in all experimental conditions.
Gain Loss
Small Euqal Large Small Euqal Large
Stress 0.57
(0.27)
0.51
(0.30)
0.65
(0.17)
0.62
(0.25)
0.67
(0.25)
0.70
(0.22)
Control 0.55
(0.25)
0.53
(0.26)
0.60
(0.23)
0.64
(0.28)
0.59
(0.26)
0.57
(0.24)
analyzed. Cortisol and adrenaline were used as predictors because
previous studies reported that these indexes of the HPA axis
and SAM system can affect risk-taking in decision-making and
HR deceleration (Putman et al., 2007; Porcelli and Delgado,
2009). For cortisol and adrenaline, change values were calculated
by subtracting values at baseline from values immediately after
the TSST, and those change values were used as predicted
variables.
Structural Model
For the rate of gamble choice, we conducted two SEMs. The
first SEM (Model 1) was conducted with changes in cortisol
and adrenaline as independent variables. Correlation between
cortisol and adrenaline was allowed (r = 0.47, p < 0.05).
As a result, a ratio chi-square/df = 18.48, GFI = 0.74 and
RMSEA = 0.82 did not indicate adequate overall fit. Therefore,
on the basis that effects of glucocorticoid on neural activity
are stronger than those of adrenaline (Joëls et al., 2006),
we modified the model by deleting a path from adrenaline
to the rate of gamble choice. Validity of this model is also
suggested by significant correlation between changes in cortisol
and the rate of gamble choice (r = −0.39, p < 0.05) and
by non-significant correlation between changes in adrenaline
and the rate of gamble choice (r = −0.30, n.s.) in the Gain
domain for participants in the Stress group (N = 12). Model
2 (Figure 8C) reached balance among statistical requirements
and fit the data reasonably well, as indicated by multiple
indicators of fit: ratio chi-square/df = 0.39, GFI = 0.98, and
RMSEA = 0.00. To evaluate improvement of fit for Models
1 and 2, AIC values (lower indicates better fit) (Schermelleh-
Engel et al., 2003) were compared for the two models. The
AIC value decreased from 34.48 for Model 1 to 16.74 for
Model 2.
Likewise, we conducted two SEMs for HR deceleration.
The first SEM (Model 3) was conducted using cortisol and
adrenaline as independent variables. Correlation between cortisol
and adrenaline was allowed; ratio chi-square/df = 18.48,
GFI = 0.74, and RMSEA = 0.82 did not indicate adequate
overall fit. For a similar reason to that in the rate of the
gamble choice model, we modified the model by deleting a
path from adrenaline to HR deceleration (Model 4). Model 4
(Figure 8D) fit the data reasonably well, as indicated by multiple
indicators of fit: ratio chi-square/df = 0.43, RMSEA = 0.00,
and GFI = 0.99. The AIC value comparing improvement of
fit strongly decreased from 34.48 for Model 3 to 16.44 for
Model 4.
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FIGURE 7 | (A) Heart rate deceleration in decision-making task. ∗Significant difference between groups (p < 0.05). (B) Waveforms of time-series variations of HR
deceleration.
DISCUSSION
Participants showed fewer risky choices in the Gain domain
2 h after exposure to acute stress, whereas no effect of acute
stress on risky choices was observed in the Loss domain. This
result replicated a previous finding of domain-specific bias
on risky decision-making (reflection effect: greater preference
for cautious options in gains rather than losses) observed
immediately after exposure to acute stress (Porcelli and Delgado,
2009) and expanded it by showing that such an effect of acute
stress can happen even later, when acute physiological stress
responses in the HPA axis and the SAM system have disappeared.
However, considering the previous finding that risk avoidance
was dominant shortly after stress (5 or 18 min) and risk-taking
was later preferred (28 min) (Pabst et al., 2013), there might
be a complicated fluctuation of preferences for risk in decision-
making from risk avoidance to risk-taking and again to risk
avoidance along the flow of time after exposure to acute stress.
This possibility should be examined more in detail, by multiple
manipulating temporal intervals between exposure to acute stress
and the decision-making task.
Stress-driven enhancement of preference for a cautious option
for a gain was found only in a condition in which the EVs of
the sure option and those of the gamble option were identical
(Equal EV level); thus, a conflict of choice was the maximum.
In conditions in which the EV of either option was greater,
participants consistently made rational decisions based on the
EV, and no influences of stress were observed. Therefore, it is
difficult to attribute the greater preference in stressed participants
for cautious gain options to the general impairment of cognitive
functions caused by stress (McEwen and Sapolsky, 1995; Vedhara
et al., 2000) or to a reduced motivation for monetary reward
caused by stress (Ossewaarde et al., 2011). Thus, we suggest
that the currently observed results were not just artifacts and
that acute stress can have substantially prolonged influences on
decision-making. We also infer that the effect of acute stress
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FIGURE 8 | Structural equation modeling for rates of gamble choice and HR deceleration. (A) The hypothetical model for rate of gamble choice. (B) The
hypothetical model for HR deceleration. (C) The result of SEM for rate of gamble choice. (D) The result of SEM for HR deceleration.
on risk-taking might be based not on habit action without
deliberation, but on strategic, goal-directed action (Schwabe and
Wolf, 2011).
Participants exposed to acute stress showed greater
magnitudes of phasic HR deceleration just after a feedback
signal in the decision-making task than did participants who
experienced no stress in the Gain domain, while both groups
indicated no differences in their HR deceleration in the Loss
domain. This domain-specificity in the prolonged effect of acute
stress on HR responses was observed only when an EV of a sure
option and that of a gamble option were equal. This result is
consistent with the present result of risk avoidance in decision-
making. Because HR deceleration following feedback can be
interpreted as a sign of attentional orienting (Bradley, 2009;
Osumi and Ohira, 2009) and monitoring feedback (Hajcak et al.,
2004), this result suggests that risk avoidance in the Gain domain
in the Stress group was induced through deliberative processes
accompanied by enhancement of attention and monitoring, but
not merely through lack of cognitive resources or abandonment
of thinking elicited by influences of stress. In addition, HR
deceleration was consistently greater when participants chose
a gamble option than when they chose a sure option in each
condition in each group, suggesting heightened attention to an
outcome of gamble (Figure 1).
Notably, HR deceleration following feedback did not directly
affect decision-making. Thus, acute stress independently affected
decision-making and HR responses. In addition, HR deceleration
after feedback was sensitive only to domains (Gain vs. Loss),
but not to outcomes (Hit vs. Miss). These findings can provide
an important suggestion for whether stress effects on decision-
making are based on experiential processes or descriptive
processes (Buckert et al., 2014). Lack of direct linkage between
HR deceleration and risk avoidance and undifferentiated HR
deceleration to Hit and Miss outcomes did not support the
experience account of stress effects on decision-making, in which
reinforcement learning processes according to online evaluations
of positive and negative outcomes are hypothesized. Present
results are more consistent with the descriptive account, arguing
that acute stress can affect decision-making through top–down
altering of representations for decision-making structures. In
both the Stress and Control groups, the rate of choice for the
gamble option was identical when a participant missed a gamble
and when he won the gamble (Table 2), suggesting that risk
avoidance for gains observed in the Stress group did not result
from the Lose-shift strategy. Furthermore, values of conditional
entropy, an index of dependency of decision-making on previous
outcomes, were generally high (H > 0.05) and did not differ
among experimental conditions (Table 3). This result means
that Stress group participants did not necessarily depend more
on outcomes of immediately previous trials for their decision-
making. Therefore, results of these behavioral indices did not
support the experiential account, but were more compatible with
the descriptive account for risk avoidance observed in the Stress
group.
Structural equation modeling results indicated that,
specifically in the equal EV condition, both the rate of choice of
risky options for gains and HR deceleration were determined
by magnitude of cortisol reactivity to acute stress before 2 h.
These consistent SEM findings suggest that the cautious shift
in decision-making for gains and enhanced attention and
monitoring processes reflected by HR deceleration, caused
by temporarily separated acute stress, might be produced via
involvement of activity in the HPA axis and glucocorticoid
receptors in the brain. Secreted cortisol, accompanied by
acute stress, can alter functions in glucocorticoid receptors
in the brain (Henckens et al., 2010, 2011) and thus can affect
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psychological processes such as emotional memory (Diamond
et al., 2007), selective attention to emotional stimuli (Henckens
et al., 2012), and working memory (Henckens et al., 2010).
The present study suggests that similar biological processes in
glucocorticoid receptors might also affect decision-making under
risk. Future research should clarify these detailed biological
mechanisms by using neuroimaging and/or pharmacological
manipulation.
Limitations of the present study should be noted. First,
the sample size of this study is small. However, as described
in Section “Results,” most significant effects sizes (η2p) were
within a reasonable range. Additionally, we determined the
sample size according to a priori analysis to determine statistical
power on the basis of Pabst et al.’s (2013) previous finding.
Thus, results reported here can be considered mostly acceptable.
Nevertheless, considering relatively wide individual differences
in present indices, these findings should be replicated with
a larger sample before drawing any concrete conclusions.
Possible causes of individual difference in indices in this
study, for example, personality traits such as trait anxiety
(Maner et al., 2007) or genetic factors such as a polymorphism
of a serotonin transporter gene (Supplement 3), should be
measured and controlled. Additionally, since medication usage
of medications was checked only by participants’ self-report,
it should be formally tested through urine samples. Second,
only male participants were examined to avoid contamination
of endocrine variations caused by women’s menstrual cycles.
Because previous studies (Preston et al., 2007; van den Bos
et al., 2009) reported sex differences in stress effects on risk-
taking, the generalizability of present findings must be further
examined with samples including both sexes. Third, we did
not use the standard TSST control condition (Het et al., 2009)
that controls the physical and cognitive load of the task.
This policy was adopted to manipulate physiological stress
responses in the SAM system and HPA axis as much as
possible. Factors of the acute stressor, including the physical
and cognitive load-caused effects on decision-making, should be
studied further. Finally, other possible physiological pathways
mediating effects of acute stress on decision-making should be
examined. For example, peripheral pro-inflammatory cytokines,
such as interleukin (IL)-1 β and IL-6, increase within 2 h
after acute stress (Yamakawa et al., 2009; Brydon et al., 2010).
These cytokines reach the brain via leaky regions of the
blood–brain barrier and afferent nerve fibers (Raison et al.,
2006; Dantzer et al., 2008), and they can affect activity
in brain regions such as the amygdala and anterior insula,
which are related to affective response (Harrison et al., 2009),
leading to modulation of social decision-making (Ohira et al.,
2013b).
Despite these limitations, the present study, to our knowledge,
has first evidenced that acute stress has prolonged influences
on decision-making within hours after exposure to a stressor,
leading to a cautious shift in for gains. These findings can provide
significant implications for involvement of physiological and
somatic factors in decision-making (Ohira, 2010; Ohira et al.,
2010, 2013a,b, 2014) not only in an experimental chamber, but
also at real financial scenes. Under economic pressures, stock
dealers might be too cautious; such effects can affect economic
situations.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
KY and HO designed the study and wrote the paper. These
two authors equally contributed to this study. KY conducted
the experiment and MM and TI supported the experiment. All
authors reviewed the manuscript.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found
online at: http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnhum.
2016.00444
REFERENCES
Bradley, M. M. (2009). Natural selective attention: orienting and
emotion. Psychophysiology 46, 1–11. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2008.
00702.x
Brydon, L., Strike, P. C., Bhattacharyya, M. R., Whitehead, D. L., McEwan, J.,
Zachary, I., et al. (2010). Hostility and physiological responses to laboratory
stress in acute coronary syndrome patients. J. Psychosom. Res. 68, 109–116. doi:
10.1016/j.jpsychores.2009.06.007
Buckert, M., Schwieren, C., Kudielka, B. M., and Fiebach, C. J. (2014). Acute
stress affects risk taking but not ambiguity aversion. Front. Neurosci. 8:82. doi:
10.3389/fnins.2014.00082
Clark, L., Li, R., Wright, C. M., Rome, F., Fairchild, G., Dunn, B. D.,
et al. (2012). Risk-avoidant decision making increased by threat of
electric shock. Psychophysiology 49, 1436–1443. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8986.2012.
01454.x
Coates, J. M., and Herbert, J. (2008). Endogenous steroids and financial risk taking
on a London trading floor. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 105, 6167–6172. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0704025105
Dantzer, R. (2006). Cytokine, sickness behavior, and depression. Neurol. Clin. 24,
441–460. doi: 10.1016/j.ncl.2006.03.003
Dantzer, R., O’Connor, J. C., Freund, G. G., Johnson, R. W., and Kelley, K. W.
(2008). From inflammation to sickness and depression: when the immune
system subjugates the brain. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 9, 46–56. doi: 10.1038/nrn2297
Diamond, D. M., Campbell, A. M., Park, C. R., Halonen, J., and Zoladz, P. R.
(2007). The temporal dynamics model of emotional memory processing: a
synthesis on the neurobiological basis of stress-induced amnesia, flashbulb
and traumatic memories, and the Yerkes-Dodson law. Neural Plast. 2007:
60803.
Dias-Ferreira, E., Sousa, J. C., Melo, I., Morgado, P., Mesquita, A. R., Cerqueira,
J. J., et al. (2009). Chronic stress causes frontostriatal reorganization and affects
decision-making. Science 325, 621–625. doi: 10.1126/science.1171203
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A. G., and Buchner, A. (2007). G∗Power 3: a flexible
statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical
sciences. Behav. Res. Methods 39, 175–191. doi: 10.3758/BF03193146
Galvan, A., and McGlennen, K. M. (2012). Daily stress increases risky decision-
making in adolescents: a preliminary study. Dev. Psychobiol. 54, 433–440. doi:
10.1002/dev.20602
Gathmann, B., Schulte, F. P., Maderwald, S., Pawlikowski, M., Starcke, K., Schäfer,
L. C., et al. (2014). Stress and decision making: neural correlates of the
interaction between stress, executive functions, and decision making under risk.
Exp. Brain. Res. 232, 957–973. doi: 10.1007/s00221-013-3808-6
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 September 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 444
fnhum-10-00444 September 10, 2016 Time: 15:11 # 11
Yamakawa et al. Prolonged Stress Effects on Decision-Making
Hajcak, G., McDonald, N., and Simons, R. F. (2004). Error-related
psychophysiology and negative affect. Brain Cogn. 56, 189–197. doi:
10.1016/j.bandc.2003.11.001
Harrison, N. A., Brydon, L., Walker, C., Gray, M. A., Steptoe, A., Dolan, R. J.,
et al. (2009). Neural origins of human sickness in interoceptive responses
to inflammation. Biol. Psychiatry 66, 415–422. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.
03.007
Henckens, M. J., van Wingen, G. A., and Fernández, G. (2011). Time-dependent
corticosteroid modulation of prefrontal working memory processing. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 5801–5806. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1019128108
Henckens, M. J., van Wingen, G. A., Joëls, M., and Fernández, G. (2010). Time-
dependent effects of corticosteroids on human amygdala processing. J. Neurosci.
30, 12725–12732. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3112-10.2010
Henckens, M. J., van Wingen, G. A., Joëls, M., and Fernández, G. (2012).
Time-dependent effects of cortisol on selective attention and emotional
interference: a functional MRI study. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 6:66. doi:
10.3389/fnint.2012.00066
Het, S., Rohleder, N., Schoofs, D., Kirschbaum, C., and Wolf, O. T. (2009).
Neuroendocrine and psychometric evaluation of a placebo version of the
‘Trier Social Stress Test’. Psychoneuroendocrinology 34, 1075–1086. doi:
10.1016/j.psyneuen.2009.02.008
Jennings, J. R., and Wood, C. C. (1976). Letter: the epsilon-adjustment procedure
for repeated-measures analyses of variance. Psychophysiology 13, 277–278. doi:
10.1111/j.1469-8986.1976.tb00116.x
Joëls, M., Pu, Z., Wiegert, O., Oitzl, M. S., and Krugers, H. J. (2006). Learning
under stress: how does it work? Trends Cogn. Sci. 10, 152–158. doi:
10.1016/j.tics.2006.02.002
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision
under risk. Econometrica 47, 263–292. doi: 10.1007/s11336-014-9425-x
Kirschbaum, C., Pirke, K. M., and Hellhammer, D. H. (1993). The ’Trier
Social Stress Test’–a tool for investigating psychobiological stress
responses in a laboratory setting. Neuropsychobiology 28, 76–81. doi:
10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2008.12.010
Kudielka, B. M., and Kirshbaum, C. (2004). “Biological bases of the stress response,”
in Stress and Addiction: Biological and Psychological Mechanisms, ed. M. Al’Absi
(Amsterdam: Elsevier), 3–19.
Kvetnansky, R., Sabban, E. L., and Palkovits, M. (2009). Catecholaminergic systems
in stress: structural and molecular genetic approaches. Physiol. Rev. 89, 535–606.
doi: 10.1152/physrev.00042.2006
Lempert, K. M., Porcelli, A. J., Delgado, M. R., and Tricomi, E. (2012). Individual
differences in delay discounting under acute stress: the role of trait perceived
stress. Front. Psychol. 19:251. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00251
Lighthall, N. R., Mather, M., and Gorlick, M. A. (2009). Acute stress increases sex
differences in risk seeking in the balloon analogue risk task. PLoS ONE 4:e6002.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0006002
Maner, J. K., Richey, J. A., Cromer, K., Mallott, M., Lejuez, C. W., Joiner, T. E., et al.
(2007). Dispositional anxiety and risk-avoidant decision-making. Pers. Individ.
Diff. 42, 665–675. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2006.08.016
McEwen, B. S., and Sapolsky, R. M. (1995). Stress and cognitive function. Curr.
Opin. Neurobiol. 5, 205–216. doi: 10.1016/0959-4388(95)80028-X
Morgado, P., Sousa, N., and Cerqueira, J. J. (2015). The impact of stress in
decision making in the context of uncertainty. J. Neurosci. Res. 93, 839–847.
doi: 10.1002/jnr.23521
Ohira, H. (2010). The somatic marker revisited: brain and body in emotional
decision making. Emot. Rev. 2, 245–249. doi: 10.1177/1754073910
362599
Ohira, H., Ichikawa, N., Kimura, K., Fukuyama, S., Shinoda, J., and Yamada, J.
(2014). Neural and sympathetic activity associated with exploration in decision-
making: further evidence for involvement of insula. Front. Behav. Neurosci.
8:381. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00381
Ohira, H., Ichikawa, N., Nomura, M., Isowa, T., Kimura, K., Kanayama, N.,
et al. (2010). Brain and autonomic association accompanying stochastic
decision-making. Neuroimage 49, 1024–1037. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.
07.060
Ohira, H., Matsunaga, M., Murakami, H., Osumi, T., Fukuyama, S., Shinoda, J.,
et al. (2013a). Neural mechanisms mediating association of sympathetic
activity and exploration in decision-making. Neuroscience 246, 362–374. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroscience.2013.04.050
Ohira, H., Osumi, T., Matsunaga, M., and Yamakawa, K. (2013b). Pro-
inflammatory cytokine predicts reduced rejection of unfair financial offers.
Neuro. Endocrinol. Lett. 34, 47–51.
Ossewaarde, L., Qin, S., Van Marle, H. J., van Wingen, G. A., Fernández, G.,
and Hermans, E. J. (2011). Stress-induced reduction in reward-
related prefrontal cortex function. Neuroimage 55, 345–352. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.11.068
Osumi, T., and Ohira, H. (2009). Cardiac responses predict decisions:
an investigation of the relation between orienting response and
decisions in the ultimatum game. Int. J. Psychophysiol. 74, 74–79. doi:
10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2009.07.007
Pabst, S., Brand, M., and Wolf, O. T. (2013). Stress and decision making: a
few minutes make all the difference. Behav. Brain Res. 250, 39–45. doi:
10.1016/j.bbr.2013.04.046
Porcelli, A. J., and Delgado, M. R. (2009). Acute stress modulates risk taking
in financial decision making. Psychol. Sci. 20, 278–283. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2009.02288.x
Preston, S. D., Buchanan, T. W., Stansfield, R. B., and Bechara, A. (2007). Effects of
anticipatory stress on decision making in a gambling task. Behav. Neurosci. 121,
257–263. doi: 10.1037/0735-7044.121.2.257
Putman, P., Hermans, E. J., and van Honk, J. (2007). Exogenous cortisol
shifts a motivated bias from fear to anger in spatial working memory
for facial expressions. Psychoneuroendocrinology 32, 14–21. doi:
10.1016/j.psyneuen.2006.09.010
Raison, C. L., Capuron, L., and Miller, A. H. (2006). Cytokines sing the blues:
inflammation and the pathogenesis of depression. Trends Immunol. 27, 24–31.
doi: 10.1016/j.it.2005.11.006
Schermelleh-Engel, K., Abraham, C., and Müller, H. (2003). Evaluating the fit of
structural equation models: tests of significance and descriptive goodness-of-fit
measures. Methods Psychol. Res. 8, 23–74.
Schwabe, L., Dalm, S., Schächinger, H., and Oitzl, M. S. (2008). Chronic stress
modulates the use of spatial and stimulus-response learning strategies in mice
and man. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 90, 495–503. doi: 10.1016/j.nlm.2008.07.015
Schwabe, L., and Wolf, O. T. (2011). Stress-induced modulation of instrumental
behavior: from goal-directed to habitual control of action. Behav. Brain Res 219,
321–328. doi: 10.1016/j.bbr.2010.12.038
Starcke, K., and Brand, M. (2012). Decision making under stress: a selective review.
Neurosci. Biobehav. Rev. 36, 1228–1248. doi: 10.1016/j.neubiorev.2012.02.003
van den Bos, R., Harteveld, M., and Stoop, H. (2009). Stress and decision-
making in humans: performance is related to cortisol reactivity, albeit
differently in men and women. Psychoneuroendocrinology 34, 1449–1458. doi:
10.1016/j.psyneuen.2009.04.016
Vedhara, K., Hyde, J., Gilchrist, I. D., Tytherleigh, M., and Plummer, S. (2000).
Acute stress, memory, attention and cortisol. Psychoneuroendocrinology 25,
535–549. doi: 10.1016/S0306-4530(00)00008-1
Vinkers, C. H., Zorn, J. V., Cornelisse, S., Koot, S., Houtepen, L. C., Olivier, B.,
et al. (2013). Time-dependent changes in altruistic punishment following stress.
Psychoneuroendocrinology 38, 1467–1475. doi: 10.1016/j.psyneuen.2012.12.012
West, S. G., Taylor, A. B., and Wu, W. (2012). “Model fit and model selection in
structural equation modeling,” in Handbook of Structural Equation Modeling,
ed. R. H. Hoyle (New York, NY: Guildford Press), 209–231.
Wolf, O. T. (2009). Stress and memory in humans: twelve years of progress? Brain
Res. 1293, 142–154. doi: 10.1016/j.brainres.2009.04.013
Yamakawa, K., Matsunaga, M., Isowa, T., Kimura, K., Kasugai, K., Yoneda, M.,
et al. (2009). Transient responses of inflammatory cytokines in acute stress. Biol.
Psychol. 82, 25–32. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsycho.2009.05.001
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was
conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could
be construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2016 Yamakawa, Ohira, Matsunaga and Isowa. This is an open-
access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original
publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 11 September 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 444
